Introduction
Promotion and job assignment policies are fundamental control mechanisms to ensure employees are able to perform the necessary functions to help organizations succeed (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012) . While promotion schemes can be used to provide effort incentives (Prendergast 1999) , recent literature suggests that the primary importance of promotions is to sort employees to the job/level that will result in the highest return on an employee's ability and skills (Gibbons and Waldman 1999; Grabner and Moers 2013) . The process of matching employees through promotions to jobs for which they are best suited occurs over time as firms learn about employees' ability and human capital acquisition (Baker et al. 1988) . Employers form initial expectations about workers' ability based on the limited information available when workers enter the labor market. Initial expectations about ability may be formed based on education, interviews, test scores, etc. Over time, employers update these expectations as workers gain experience in the labor market through observing successive on-the-job performance, and promote employees accordingly (e.g., Murphy 1986; Gibbons and Waldman 1999) . In this paper we examine two primary questions: First, how do managers weight initial assessments of employee ability versus subsequent objective performance when making promotion decisions? Second, how do these relative weights change over time as firms accumulate information about employee ability?
While the theoretical literature has long recognized that the performance evaluation underpinning employer learning and employee promotion is fundamentally a dynamic process (Holmstrom 1999) , there is little empirical research to show how managers use performance measures over time to update expectations about employee ability. Prior research on employer learning generally assumes beliefs about worker ability are revised through a Bayesian updating process, which implies that managers rationally incorporate new information and weight it against prior signals based on the relative informativeness of each (Farber and Gibbons 1996; Altonji and Pierret 2001; Lange 2007; Grabner and Moers 2013; Kahn and Lange 2014) . In contrast, research in judgement and decision making documents cognitive limitations and biases that influence the way individuals update beliefs to reflect new information (Bonner 2008 ). To our knowledge, prior research does not examine the impact of these behavioral factors on firms'
ability to learn about employee quality or their effect on promotion decisions.
Several prior studies examine supervisors' use of discretion for rewarding employees, and document evidence consistent with cognitive limitations or bias influencing subjective evaluations (Bailey et al. 2011; Bol 2011; Bol and Smith 2011; Woods 2012; Anderson et al. 2014 ). Our study differs from prior research in this area in important ways. Prior research examines discretionary performance evaluation in the context of bonuses, while we study promotion decisions. For bonuses, the purpose of evaluation is to infer effort, whereas for promotions the purpose is to infer ability (Moers 2005; Gibbs 2008 ). This suggests a short-term focus for bonus decisions, but a long-term focus, and perhaps a dynamic element for promotion decisions. Thus, whereas previous studies focus on the static effect of a performance measure on subjective evaluation on an unrelated task, we investigate how objective performance measures are used to update beliefs about worker ability as a whole, and how their use changes as firms accumulate experience with workers. 1 1 Anderson et al. (2014) also examine how supervisors' use of performance measures changes over time, but their focus is on supervisors' experience with the rating task over a relatively short window (five quarters), while we focus on supervisors' experience with the worker over a relatively long time period (up to six years). Anderson et al. (2014) explicitly assume limited if any changes in supervisors' impressions of worker ability over their study period, whereas examining how firms update beliefs about worker ability is a primary focus of our paper.
We examine our research questions using extensive performance and promotion data from Minor League Baseball (MiLB). In doing so, we follow recent research in business and economics that makes use of sports settings to answer important economic questions (Chapman and Southwick 1991; Spurr and Barber 1994; Edmans et al. 2007; Berger and Pope 2011; Pope and Schweitzer 2011; Cadman and Cassar 2013; Allen et al. forthcoming) . Our research setting offers several unique advantages. First, promotions in our setting are relatively frequent, and follow a well-defined hierarchical path, which increases the power of our tests due to reduced measurement error in our dependent variable (promotion events). Second, we are able to observe detailed objective measures of individual employee output over time. Third, for each employee in our sample, we obtain assessments of worker ability prior to the employee's entering the labor market. This is possible because in our setting workers enter the labor market through a formal draft; workers deemed to have greater ability are selected earlier, and we can observe each worker's draft position. This unique setting therefore allows us to map our empirical work closely to established theoretical models in which employers form initial expectations of employee ability and update their priors over time based on observed performance (e.g., Gibbons and Waldman 1999). Fourth, we are able to hold constant the basic nature of the work task for all employees across each hierarchical level.
We obtain promotion and performance data for over twelve thousand unique employees (over forty thousand employee-year observations) in approximately thirty different organizations over the period . We find strong evidence that employers' initial assessments about employee ability predict promotion decisions, even after several years on the job. Across every hierarchical level, unconditional promotion rates for employees with initial assessed ability in the top quartile are significantly higher than for employees in the bottom quartile, with differences ranging from 25-67%. These differences in promotion rates lead to dramatic differences in career attainment: Employees initially assessed to be in the top quartile of their cohort are nearly 8.5
times more likely to reach the highest job assignment level within five years following entering the labor market.
We find that both initial subjective assessments and subsequent objective performance measures are associated with promotion decisions, but the relative weight on each changes over time as employers have successive opportunities to observe on-the-job performance. We find that the weight placed on initial ability assessments is larger than for on-the-job performance following a worker's first year on the job by about 12%. In subsequent years, the weight on objective performance increases, while the weight on the initial assessment decreases, so that objective performance receives almost twice as much weight in promotion decisions as initial assessments following a second year of employment, and over 3.7 times as much weight after five years of performance data have been observed. While the relative weight placed on objective performance increases over time, initial assessments of ability remain significant predictors of promotion decisions up to six years later, and persist even after controlling for current as well as past objective performance. We also find that initial assessments influence promotion decisions by affecting the sensitivity of promotions to current objective performance measures. We observe greater weight on performance when it is consistent with expectations implied by initial assessments; for workers who were initially assessed in the top quartile of their cohort, above-average performance receives relatively greater weight, and below-average performance receives relatively lesser weight. For workers initially assessed in the bottom quartile, this pattern is flipped.
That employers still rely on their initial assessments for promotion decisions after several years is perhaps surprising given that in our setting performance is readily observable by managers, and worker production is easily captured by the performance measurement system.
We therefore examine whether the relative weights placed on initial assessments and objective performance are justified by their respective ability to predict future performance. We find that current performance is significantly associated with future performance in each of a worker's first six years on the job. Moreover, controlling for current performance, prior performance (up to two years prior) is also associated with future performance. Thus, objective performance measures appear to be useful inputs for promotion decisions in our setting. We also find that initially assessed ability predicts future performance prior to the first year on the job. However, once a worker has at least a year of on-the-job experience, we find no association between initial assessments and future performance, even though initial assessments are related to promotion decisions in each year.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. We contribute to the literature on the use of performance measures for promotion decisions (e.g., Gibbs 1995; Campbell 2008; Cichello et al. 2009; Grabner and Moers 2013; Chan 2015) . We extend these prior studies by examining the use of performance measures over time, recognizing that employer learning is a dynamic process. We find that the effect of objective performance on promotions follows an inverted U-shaped pattern; the weight on objective performance increases over the first few years on the job and then declines thereafter. This pattern is consistent with employers using observed performance to learn about worker ability; but after a point, employers' "make up their minds" about worker ability, and beliefs are less susceptible to revision. How readily employers revise their initial beliefs about worker ability after observing performance is critical for the provision of incentives within firms; if employers quickly incorporate performance measures into expectations about worker ability, which in turn impact job assignment and salary decisions, the payoffs for effort are relatively high. Conversely, if employers are slow to update their beliefs and continue to hold onto initial impressions about workers, incentives to work hard are muted.
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We also add to the literature on supervisors' discretionary use of performance measures for rewarding employees (Ittner et al. 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004) , and particularly the growing number of studies documenting the impact of managers' cognitive biases on the performance evaluation process. All but a few studies in this area examine discretion in determining bonus payments as opposed to making promotion decisions. However, promotion decisions are a particularly interesting outcome for studying the weighting of performance measures because promotion decisions are especially likely to involve discretion (Bol 2008; Campbell 2008) , and the long-term compensation (and therefore, incentive) implications of promotions are large relative to bonuses (e.g., Baker et al. 1994) . 3 Thus, empirical examination of how managers translate performance measures and other information into promotion decisions is particularly important for understanding explicit and implicit contracting arrangements within firms (Pendergrast 1999).
Moreover, prior studies on cognitive biases in performance evaluation (and the large literature on confirmation bias more generally) generally use lab experiments (Bonner 2008) . In contrast, we document evidence consistent with confirmation bias using archival data on performance and job assignments. Prior research investigates the moderating effect of incentives 2 The speed of employer learning also has important implications for a number of other issues in labor economics, such as the signaling role of education (e.g., Spence 1973) and the returns to investing in human capital (Lange 2007; Kahn and Lange 2014) . 3 Bonus calculations commonly rely at least in part on explicit formulas to determine the relation between performance measures and bonuses. To our knowledge, explicit formulas are rarely used for promotion decisions.
for rating accuracy as well as the persistence of biases over time. In lab settings, it is difficult to manipulate these dimensions sufficiently to approximate conditions found in the field. 4 In our setting, promoting the best players through the minor league system and up to the major leagues is critical to the success of the organizations we study, and extensive attention and resources are devoted to performance evaluation and job assignment decisions. Moreover, we observe workers and promotion decisions over multi-year periods. Our use of archival data from a setting characterized by strong incentives to accurately assess worker ability and multiple years observing employees makes our findings especially notable relative to the prior literature.
We extend the literature in labor economics on employer learning and careers within organizations by providing evidence on how readily supervisors "change their minds" about worker ability after forming an initial opinion. Our findings have implications for the interpretation of serial correlation in promotion rates (i.e., "fast tracks") documented in prior research (Baker et al. 1994 ). In our setting, fast tracks appear to be established before employees start working, and some employees may stay on the fast track despite, not because of, their performance.
Background and Hypothesis Development

Employer learning about worker ability
A fundamental role of job assignments within organizations is to sort employees into positions for which they are best suited to achieve organizational objectives. That is, skill levels vary across employees, and jobs vary in the skills required for success. A common perspective with which to view hierarchies within firms is that jobs at higher levels place greater demands on employees' skills, and thus promotions are a means of matching higher-skilled employees to jobs where their skills yield a greater return to the firm (e.g., Gibbons and Waldman 1999 (Campbell 2008; Cichello et al. 2009; Grabner and Moers 2013) . In general, however, observed performance measures reflect both worker ability and noise, so firms are expected to update beliefs about employee ability imperfectly. Moreover, worker ability is expected to change over time, due for example to human capital acquisition (Becker 1965) . In a recent study on employer learning and its implications for wage dynamics, Kahn and Lange (2014, p. 1577) conclude that employers learn about worker ability over time, but they "make substantial errors in wage setting" as they try to hit a moving target of worker ability.
The prevailing assumption in much of the prior literature is that managers incorporate available information in a manner consistent with Bayes Rule. Under a Bayesian updating framework, employers form a prior distribution (or, informally, a "prior") for worker ability based on whatever signals are initially available when the worker enters the labor market. Each subsequently observed performance measure provides a basis for employers to update beliefs about the distribution of worker quality. Both the initial information and subsequent performance measures are noisy signals for worker ability; how quickly employers update their beliefs depends on the relative informativeness of each.That is, after n performance periods, a firm's revised beliefs about worker ability are formed based on a weighted average of the prior distribution and n performance assessments, with weights determined based on informativeness.
Consistent with Bayesian updating, we expect promotion likelihood to be positively associated with current objective performance measures to the extent these measures are informative about future ability. Similarly, we also expect managers to weight past objective measures in promotion decisions. When the primary purpose of promotions is to sort employees by their level of ability, previous performance may be useful because expanding the performance window is likely to better reflect employee ability than using only a single year (Gibbs 2008).
However, to the extent workers' effective ability evolves over time, prior measures become outdated. We therefore expect current performance to be more informative about effective ability, and thus more heavily weighted, compared to each prior measure individually. However, the collective information contained in prior measures may outweigh current performance and receive weight in promotion decisions accordingly.
We also expect firms' initial assessments about employees' ability to be positively associated with promotion decisions, at least in the early years of workers' careers. However, on-the-job performance is likely to be more informative about worker ability than initial assessments for at least two reasons. First, as workers' effective ability develops (or in some cases, declines) over time, initial assessments become outdated and therefore less informative about future ability.
Second, initial assessments are based on performance environments further removed from the job assignment for which the worker is being considered. 5 Under a Bayesian framework, in settings where performance measures are informative about worker ability, employers can be expected to quickly revise noisy and outdated first impressions, so that after relatively few periods, promotion decisions are based on realized on-the-job performance and not initial assessments. While it is not clear ex ante how long initial assessments will remain informative about worker ability, we expect each successive measure of on-the-job performance will be strictly more informative than an initial assessment, and therefore will receive greater weight in promotion decisions.
The strength of the signals upon which initial assessments are made is likely to differ depending on the channel through which workers enter the labor market. Assessments for workers who attended college are likely to be more informative because less projection is required for older players, and the performance environment and skill required for college play is more similar to the professional level than is high school. As well, having already attended high school, college players are likely to have been observed by potential employers for longer.
Therefore, we expect initial assessments for former college players to receive greater weight in promotion decisions than for their high-school counterparts.
In contrast to the Bayesian updating perspective, psychological research suggests people may weight signals based on the order in which they are received, and not just on the properties of the signals per se. A number of studies provide evidence for "confirmation bias," a cognitive bias which occurs when individuals anchor on the information they receive first, so that subsequent information gathering and processing are biased to support initially formed beliefs.
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In the context of Bayesian updating, such anchoring suggests that initial signals may lead to irrationally strong prior beliefs (i.e., overestimating the informativeness of initial signals), causing managers to revise expectations of employee ability too slowly after observing on-thejob performance. In contrast to rational Bayesian updating, if managers are susceptible to a "primacy effect", the importance of initial assessments for promotion decisions will decline slowly if at all. Moreover, managers may place increased weight on past measures of performance relative to current measures.
Confirmation bias also manifests when individuals differentially weight signals that are supportive of a previously held belief compared to signals that go against those beliefs (e.g., Bamber et al. 1997) . This suggests that managers may place different weight on observed performance measures depending on how these measures compare to managers' initial assessments about players' ability.
In summary, economic theory predicts that if the purpose of promotions is to sort employees by expected ability, the importance (or weighting) of different signals for promotion decisions should reflect the relative informativeness of the signals about worker ability. While the relative informativeness of initial assessments versus on-the-job performance measures may change over time as employee ability develops, after controlling for informativeness, the relative order in which the signals are received should not influence their use in promotion decisions (or their use in updating beliefs about worker ability more generally).
In contrast, psychology theory predicts that temporal order may matter for how signals are used for belief updating. If supervisors anchor on initial assessments of worker quality, over time promotion decisions may continue to reflect greater weight on initial assessments than is warranted based on informativeness, and the weighting of on-the-job performance measures may depend on their perceived consistency with the initial assessment. In our empirical tests described below, we examine the extent to which the implied weighting for promotion decisions of initial assessments and on-the-job performance reflect their respective informativeness as predicted by economic theory, or is consistent with order effects as suggested by the psychology literature.
Research setting
To examine our research questions, we obtain performance and job assignment data for professional baseball players employed in Minor League Baseball (MiLB), which is a hierarchical system of developmental leagues below Major League Baseball (MLB). We acknowledge that professional baseball is a departure from "typical" business environments of more general interest to researchers. We also recognize that professional athletes may exhibit personality and behavioral tendencies that differ from a more general population of workers.
However, we emphasize that we examine promotion decisions concerning professional athletes, not the athletes' performance or behavior per se. Thus, while the specific job task, and the workers who perform it, may be unique to our setting, we expect the task of evaluating performance and making job assignments accordingly to be much more general.
MiLB teams are typically independently owned, but each is affiliated with an MLB franchise through a formal agreement called a Player Development Contract. This agreement specifies that personnel decisions are made by the MLB franchise (i.e., "parent"). Thus, while
MiLB teams operate as businesses in their own right, from a personnel perspective the primary purpose of these teams and leagues is to develop players and prepare them to play at the Major League level.
Within MiLB there are seven levels, ranging from "Rookie" to "Triple-A," with the primary distinction across levels being the ability of the players assigned to teams in each level.
When players enter professional baseball, they are generally assigned to a team at the lower levels of MiLB, but can work towards the major league level through a succession of promotions. While the possibility of promotion provides very strong effort incentives for MiLB players, the primary purpose of promotions from the parent organization's perspective is a means of developing players' ability by matching them to job assignments for which they are best suited.
Workers enter the labor market through a formal draft process, which occurs in June of each year. 7 The draft is organized into rounds, and within each round each team may select one player. The draft continues for 40 rounds. Each MLB organization employs a scouting department to evaluate potential draftees for ability and potential to succeed in professional baseball. Thus, the draft order provides a ranking of expected ability (or potential future ability) based on assessments made prior to a player's entering the labor market. Once a team selects a player in the draft, the team obtains exclusive rights to sign the player. Before a contract is signed, the player and team may negotiate a signing bonus. 8 The employment contract itself is collectively bargained, and stipulates that the parent organization retains exclusive rights to the player for seven years (i.e., workers are not free to move from one organization to another) at salaries determined by the level of job assignment.
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We focus our analysis on MiLB pitchers, whose job entails preventing the opposing hitters from scoring points, or "runs." Performance evaluation in MiLB is ubiquitous. In addition to direct observation by coaches and supervisors, nearly every conceivable outcome is recorded (e.g., runs, hits, walks, strikeouts, etc.). While objective performance measures are readily available, these measures capture effective ability with noise in that recorded outcomes do not perfectly reflect ability. For example, a well-pitched ball may still be struck hard or away from a fielder resulting in scoring, or a poorly pitched ball may be swung at and missed.
Sample Selection and Variable Measurement
We obtain draft position, performance, and job assignment data for all affiliated minor league pitchers who began their careers between 1987 and 2013. 10,11 A primary purpose of our study is to investigate the role of initial assessments and on-the-job performance, and therefore we focus our analyses on players in their early careers; we limit our sample to players who have six years of experience in professional baseball or fewer. 12 We analyze promotions for pitchers only in our tests because the job roles and promotion opportunities for pitchers are relatively homogeneous compared to players in other positions, allowing for more standardized evaluation criteria. 13 We remove players for whom we cannot observe draft information. This exclusion, which removes observations for undrafted players (predominantly internationally-signed players), results in a sample of 41,043 observations for 12,444 players.
Our measure of promotion is based on a comparison of an employee's primary job level in a given year with his primary job level in the subsequent year. Specifically, Promotion is an indicator variable equal to one if a player's primary job level is higher in year t+1 than for year t.
If a player works at multiple job levels in a given year, we designate the level at which the player played most, based on innings pitched, as the primary job level.
We measure Performance as the average number of runs attributable to the pitcher per nine innings played (i.e., the standard length of a baseball game), for the primary job level each year. This measure, commonly referred to as "Earned Run Average" (ERA) is a widely-used measure of pitching performance, and summarizes how effectively a pitcher performed his primary job task, which is to prevent the opposing team from scoring runs. To facilitate interpretation of our results, we multiply ERA by -1 so that higher levels of our measure reflect better performance, and we standardize the resulting measure. PriorPerformance is the standardized negative of a player's cumulative ERA for all years prior to the current year.
12 In our data, on average players reach their highest job assignment level after about 2 years of experience, and the 75 th percentile reach their highest job level after 3 years of experience. 13 For example, while the job task of pitchers can be easily summarized as preventing runs, other positions are evaluated with differing emphasis on offense, defense, and running ability. Moreover, because each team needs only a single player at each non-pitcher position (along with a couple of multi-position backup players), non-pitchers' promotion opportunities are more likely to be impacted by the performance of other players at their same position at higher job levels.
While we base our measure of performance on ERA because of its wide usage and straightforward interpretation relative to a team's objective for winning games, in general pitcher performance can be measured in a variety of ways, and it is likely teams consider many different performance measures in making promotion decisions. Our dataset enables us to capture many of these common measures (e.g., wins, strikeouts, walks, etc.). We focus on a single performance measure because our objective is to study the relative use of initial assessments and objective performance compared to a benchmark of their relative informativeness; we also study how the use of these inputs changes over time. Thus, a single measure of performance is sufficient for our purpose.
14 Our proxy for teams' InitialAssessment of player ability is the log of draft position. As discussed above, draft position reflects the order in which players are selected by teams, and thus lower numbers reflect players taken earlier, and having higher assessed ability. To aid interpretation and comparability with Performance, we multiply by -1 and standardize this measure.
We use several control variables we expect are related to job assignment decisions. We control for Age (measured as the standardized log of a player's age in years as of the midpoint in the season) because younger players may be less developed and thus less likely to be prepared for higher-level job assignments. Similarly, we use an indicator for whether a player was drafted following playing baseball in college (College), as former college players are expected to be more developed players, all else equal. We include LeaguePerformance, which is the standardized negative of the overall ERA for the league in which a player competes. To the extent teams use relative performance information when making promotion decisions (Chan 14 Because we do not observe all possible performance measures available to teams, we do not attempt to address how the weight on initial assessments compares to the combined weight on all objective performance measures. 2015), we expect LeaguePerformance to be negatively associated with promotion likelihood. We measure Experience as the number of prior years of professional experience (i.e., Experience is equal to 0 in a player's first year). While players with low experience are likely to be less developed, holding job level constant, players with more experience are more likely to have been passed over previously, and thus have a lower likelihood of being promoted in the future. In tests for which we partition our sample by years of Experience, we alternatively control for Repeat, which is an indicator for whether a player's primary job level in the current year is the same as for the previous year. promotions are a regular occurrence: the overall probability of promotion across all levels is 51%. The highest probability of promotion exists in Level 3 (Short-season A) at 66%, while the lowest probability of promotion exists in Level 7 (AAA) at 19%. These findings are roughly consistent with achieving promotions becoming relatively more difficult as employees advance within the organization. The average player in our sample is approximately 23 years old (untabulated), and 76% of the players were drafted out of college. We examine relations between performance, initially-assessed worker quality, promotion likelihood, and future performance in greater depth using multivariate regression techniques in Tables 4-7.   Table 3 , Panel A presents employee outcomes by initial assessment quartile. We examine four potential outcomes following each worker-year observation: workers may be promoted, stay in their current job level, be demoted, or exit the labor market. We note that our sample is predominantly composed of relatively highly assessed workers, due to the fact that lower assessed workers are less likely to sign a contract and enter professional baseball and also have a higher exit probability. Workers with the highest initial assessments relative to their cohort (i.e., players in the highest (earliest) initial assessment quartile-Q4), have the highest promotion likelihood in the full sample, and in each level within the organizational hierarchy. For the full sample, the promotion likelihood for workers assessed in Q4 compared to workers assessed in Q1 is greater by approximately 25% ((.557/.444)-1). This pattern exists for each hierarchical level. For the full sample, the likelihood of either repeating a level or being demoted is increasing in initial assessment, while the likelihood of exiting the labor market is decreasing in initial assessment, perhaps due to lower-assessed players, viewing their potential for future promotion to be lower, opting to exit the labor market rather than to repeat a level or to be demoted. Table 3 provide striking descriptive evidence for initial assessments, made prior to workers entering the labor market, having a dramatic impact on career attainment.
Research Design and Results
Descriptive analysis
Promotion weight on initial assessments vs. on-the-job performance
The preceding analyses provide strong descriptive evidence for the importance of initial assessments in determining worker career attainment in our setting. This association may result because initial assessments are informative about ability throughout players' MiLB careers.
However, even in this scenario supervisors need not directly rely on initial assessments for promotion decisions; if initial assessments predict performance, and supervisors base promotions on performance, we will similarly observe a relation between initial assessments and promotions.
Alternatively, supervisors may anchor on initial assessments, such that these prior beliefs about ability influence promotion decisions even after initial assessments are no longer informative about ability. To examine these alternatives, we estimate linear probability models (LPM where the variables are defined as above and in the Appendix. Table 4 Panel A presents results for the weighting of objective performance and initial assessments of worker quality for promotion decisions using our overall sample. Columns 1 and 2 examine the weight for Performance and InitialAssessment separately to provide a baseline for their respective importance for promotion decisions. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in Performance is associated with an increase in promotion probability of roughly 14.1 percent, while a one-standard-deviation increase in Initial Assessment is associated with an increase of roughly 8.0 percent. Both estimates are significant at the 1% level. Column 3 includes both Performance and InitialAssessment together, along with PriorPerformance and control variables. We find that in this combined model, the effects of Performance and InitialAssessment remain mostly unchanged. Also, our results suggest supervisors weight past as well as current performance in promotion decisions, as predicted. However, the weight on prior performance is much smaller than for current performance (.0205 vs. .1496, both statistically significant), suggesting that supervisors perceive current performance to be much more 16 A common reason cited for using probit or logistic models rather than LPM is that the latter can result in predicted probabilities outside the interval [0,1]. Our primary LPM model results in predictions outside this interval for approximately 670 of our 29,716 regression observations (2.25%). More to the point, however, since our focus is on estimating the partial effect of initial assessments and subsequent performance on promotion probability, and NOT generating predicted probabilities, that some predicted values are outside of the [0,1] interval is of minimal importance (Wooldridge 2002) . In unreported robustness tests, we repeat our main analyses in Table 4 using probit and logistic models and our inferences are similar except for an insignificant positive coefficient on * in the probit and logistic specifications for LeaguePerformance is associated with a lower promotion probability. Experience is negatively associated with promotion likelihood, though not significantly so, indicating that holding Level fixed, promotion probability declines over time. We find that older players are less likely to be promoted, all else equal, while College is associated with increased promotion likelihood.
In Column 4 of Panel A, we examine whether the importance of initial assessments is greater for workers with college experience. Consistent with supervisors perceiving that for college players the initial assessment is relatively more informative about worker quality, we find a significant positive interaction between College and InitialAssessment.
In Column 5, we investigate how the weights for Performance, PriorPerformance, and
InitialAssessment vary over time by introducing interactions between these variables and
Experience. We find that the weight on Performance and InitialAssessment declines over time, while the weight on PriorPerformance increases. This pattern is consistent with on-the-job performance measures being useful for supervisors to learn about worker quality, and thus supervisors shift weight from initial assessments to observed performance over time. That the weight on Performance decreases and PriorPerformance increases is expected from a Bayesian updating perspective if current performance is roughly equally informative about worker quality each year, but supervisors have an increasing amount of informative prior performance signals to include in promotion decisions as they gain experience with workers.
We next examine whether the weights observed in the preceding discussion are consistent with economic theories that suggest that when making promotion decisions, supervisors weight signals based on informativeness about worker ability. To proxy for informativeness, we estimate similar models as in Table 4 Panel A, but we estimate future (next year's) Performance rather than promotion probabilities in Table 4 Panel B. This approach is similar to that used by Ittner et al. (2003) in assessing whether supervisors' weights of objective vs. subjective measures are driven by informativeness for bonus decisions. For this analysis, we make a (perhaps strong) assumption that supervisors should promote employees based on expected near-term future performance. For these regressions, we additionally include fixed effects for future Level because we expect future performance to be systematically related to the level at which an employee performs. Overall, the idea behind the regressions in Table 4 Panel B is to provide a benchmark for the general reasonableness of the relative promotion weights on Performance and
InitialAssessment that we observe in Table 4 Panel A, with the caveat that the models employed in across these two panels employ different dependent variables.
In Panel B, we see that across each model the coefficient on Performance is roughly similar to that in the respective models in Panel A, which is consistent with supervisors weighting current objective performance measures according to their informativeness about ability. For PriorPerformance, the coefficients are much larger than what we observe in the promotion models, suggesting that supervisors under-weight prior performance in promotion decisions relative to its ability to signal worker quality. Strikingly, for InitialAssessment, we observe a negative association with future performance, in contrast to the relatively large positive weight placed on this measure by supervisors in promotion decisions. A potential explanation for this result is that supervisors over-rely on initial assessments so that all else equal, higher assessed workers are promoted more than their current skillsets warrant; thus, these workers underperform in the future. This large estimated difference in coefficients for the promotion model vs. the future performance model is supportive of supervisors anchoring on initial assessments, leading to biased promotion decisions.
In Table 5 Panel A, we test for the possibility that supervisors anchor on initial assessments, which results in them giving differing importance to observed performance depending on whether performance is consistent with prior beliefs. Specifically, we replace
Performance and InitialAssessment with separate measures of Performance for workers in each quartile (by cohort) of initial assessment. We also include an indicator PerformanceGood, for whether performance is greater than the average for peer workers in the same league/year and interact PerformanceGood with each measure of Performance by quartile of InitialAssessment.
In Column 1, we find a large main effect of PerformanceGood, even after including continuous measures of performance (PerformanceQ1-PerformanceQ4), suggesting that supervisors use above-average performance as a heuristic for worker quality above and beyond performance per se. The coefficients on PerformanceQ1 -PerformanceQ4 represent the weight on observed below-average performance for each quartile. We find that the weight placed on "bad performance" is decreasing for workers who were initially assessed as higher quality, suggesting that supervisors discount bad performance if it runs counter to their expectations for the worker.
Moreover, the interaction terms, which represent the incremental weight placed on good performance across quartiles, are negative and significant for Q1 and Q2 (below median InitialAssessment), negative and insignificant for Q3, and significantly positive for Q4. This is consistent with supervisors discounting good performance for workers for whom they have low expectations and emphasizing good performance for workers who are expected to be the best. At the same time, supervisors emphasize bad performance for workers for whom expectations are low, and appear to discount bad performance for workers expected to be of higher quality. This pattern, depicted in Figure 1 , is consistent with supervisors' anchoring on initial assessments affecting their ability to use objective performance measures to update beliefs about worker ability, and provides at least some explanation for the dramatic impact of initial assessments on worker career outcomes documented in Table 3 .
In Column 2, we include InitialAssessment to observe the main effect on promotions separate from the effect due to differential weighting based on performance consistent with expectations. While the pattern across quartiles is no longer monotonic (and in general the weights on "bad performance" across quartiles are similar), a comparison of the difference in weight on bad and good performance for Q1 vs. Q4 workers reveals the same pattern as in Column 1. Specifically, for low-expected-quality employees, bad performance is weighted 47%
greater than good performance, while for high-expected-quality employees bad performance receives roughly 32% less weight than good performance. Moreover, the difference in total weight on good performance for Q4 vs. Q1 workers is economically large (82% greater) and significant (p = .017).
In Table 5 Panel B, we perform similar analyses to Table 5 Panel A using future performance as the dependent variable. As in Table 4 Panel B, Performance is positively related to future performance, while InitialAssessment is negatively relative to future performance. We find an inverted U-shaped pattern in the incremental weights on good performance, but find little evidence of significantly different weighting of good versus bad performance in predicting future performance. Comparing these results with the results in Table 5 Panel A again suggests the possibility of managers' exhibiting bias in promotion decisions relative to variables that predict employees' future performance.
Promotion weights by worker experience
In Table 6 Panel A, we repeat our model of promotion decisions after partitioning our sample based on Experience to examine more directly how weights change over time using seemingly unrelated regression. Notably, for employees in their first year of experience (Experience=0), InitialAssessment receives greater weight in promotion decisions than Performance (the difference is significant at the 5% level). However, the importance of InitialAssessment declines sharply with Experience, while for Performance the coefficients follow an inverted-U pattern over time. Thus, it appears supervisors at least partially recognize the declining usefulness of initial assessments, and adjust their use of it accordingly. However, across each column, we continue to find a significant association between InitialAssessment and
Promotion.
In Table 6 Panel B, we estimate models of future performance across partitions of Experience. We find that InitialAssessment is significantly associated with Performance in a worker's first year on the job, validating the ability of teams' scouting departments to identify superior players and draft accordingly. However, following a worker's first year on the job, and continuing through four years of experience, InitialAssessment has no predictive value for future performance, notwithstanding the positive weights on InitialAssessment in the promotion models. Following an employee's fifth year, initial assessments are negatively associated with future performance. This negative association is again consistent with managers' using measures (InitialAssessment) for promotion decisions that seem inconsistent with future performance, and may indicate bias.
Promotion weights by organizational level
In the preceding analyses, a possibility is that supervisors give workers with higher initial assessments more difficult job assignments to stretch them, which may be optimal from a developmental standpoint. While we control for level fixed effects in the above analysis, it may be the case that the effect of InitialAssessment on promotions and future performance differs across levels. To examine this possibility, we repeat our regressions after partitioning on Level.
The results, presented in Table 7 Panels A and B, are consistent with those of partitions on
Experience. For promotion decisions (Table 7 Panel A), we find larger coefficients on
InitialAssessment at the lower levels, although the effect persists even at the highest level of
MiLB. The importance of Performance for promotion decisions is generally increasing across levels, although the coefficient declines sharply at the highest level. For future performance (Table 7 Panel B), we again find that Performance is a significant predictor of future performance, while InitialAssessment is generally not. We observe a significant negative coefficient on InitialAssessment for the highest level of MiLB, consistent with Table 6 Panel B and with managers' making promotion decisions using inputs that are at best not predictive, and at worst negatively predictive, of future employee success.
Conclusion
In this paper we bring together streams of research from labor economics on careers in organizations and employer learning and from accounting on the use of performance measures.
The economics literature documents that firms learn about worker ability, which shapes workers' career progression, but does not examine how firms learn. The accounting literature documents that supervisors' cognitive limitations and biases influence performance evaluation, but does not examine how these limitations impact workers' careers. By shedding light on how supervisors use objective performance measures for promotion decisions, and their over-reliance on initial impressions long after they are informative about worker ability, we make important contributions to both literatures.
Prior research on employer learning has generally relied on either broad survey data to answer high-level questions about career progression or has used detailed personnel records from a single firm to descriptively examine promotion patterns within firms. A central feature of the theoretical models in this field is that performance measurement is a dynamic process. One implication from this research is that an important role of performance measurement systems is to facilitate employer learning about employees' ability over time. However, to this point the empirical research in this area has not examined how supervisors weight performance signals over time, or how these signals are used to update initial assessments of ability. By utilizing a unique dataset that combines detailed promotion data across hierarchical levels with corresponding performance measures over time, we are able to provide evidence on this important topic.
Our study contributes to the judgement and decision making literature by using archival data to document supervisors' over-reliance on initial assessments even in the face of informative objective performance measures. Moreover, we find this effect occurs in part due to differential weighting of objective performance measures depending on whether or not realized performance is consistent with initial expectations. The majority of evidence for supervisors' biased performance evaluations is from experimental research generated in lab settings. In two recent studies, Woods (2012) and Anderson et al. (2014) use field data to document that supervisors allow ancillary performance measures to influence ratings on an unrelated dimension, consistent with confirmation bias. Our study compliments and extends this prior research. First, whereas Woods (2012) and Anderson et al. (2014) both examine performance appraisal for bonus computations, our study examines promotion decisions. Also, both Woods (2012) and Anderson et al. (2014) examine settings in which the ratings task was recently introduced as part of an overhaul to an existing incentive system, and both studies posit that the unfamiliarity with the task contributes to supervisors tendency to anchor on ancillary measures.
In our setting, the task of evaluating worker ability to determine job assignments is essentially the same over a 27-year sample period, yet we find evidence of confirmation bias that persists even after up to six years of on-the-job performance has been observed. Our results suggest that supervisors are slow to revise beliefs about worker ability even when the evaluation task is familiar and incentives to promote the best worker are strong. We leave it to future research to explore alternative means of mitigating supervisors' confirmation bias in promotion settings.
Appendix -Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition Data Source
+1
Indicator variable equal to one if player i's primary job level (i.e., the level at which player i accumulates the most playing time in a given year) in year t + 1 is higher than the primary job level in year t.
SABR
Earned-run average (ERA) of player i during year t. ERA is a commonly-used summary performance measure for pitchers. This measure is calculated as the average number of runs attributed to the pitcher per nine innings pitched (i.e., the typical length of a baseball game). We multiply this measure by -1 so that higher values of Performance it indicate better performance.
Cumulative earned-run average (ERA) of player i prior to year t. This measure is calculated as the total cumulative earned runs attributed to the pitcher per nine innings pitched (i.e., the typical length of a baseball game). We multiply this measure by -1 so that higher values of Performance it indicate better performance.
The natural logarithm of the overall pick number with which player i is selected in a given year. We multiply this measure by -1 so that higher values of Initial Assessment indicate more favorable initial assessments of player ability.
Average earned-run average (ERA) of the league in which player i plays during year t.
Prior labor market experience, in years. SABR The natural logarithm of the age in years of player i during year t.
Indicator variable equal to one if a player was drafted out of college; zero otherwise.
Figure 1: Differential Weighting of Performance Based on Consistency with Prior Expectations
Note: This figure depicts regression estimates for the weighting of objective performance for promotion decisions, based on Table 5 , Panel A Columns 1 (above) and 2 (below). The blue line represents the regression coefficient on Performance that is below the league average, estimated separately by quartiles of initial assessment, with Q1-Q4 increasing in initial assessment. The red line represents the regression coefficients for performance that is above the league average. 
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